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STATEMENT OF FACTS
At a regular meeting of Cedar City Council on 19
February, 1953 said City Council duly passed an ordinance entitled "An Ordinance granting to Southern
Utah Power Company an electric light, heat and power
franchise .and repealing an ordinance granting to Southern Utah Power Company an electric light, heat and
power franchise dated the 23rd day of March, A. D. 1944."
This ordinance was duly published in the Iron County
Record, a newspaper of Ge·neral Circulation in Iron
County, Utah including the City of Cedar City, Utah on
the 26th day of February, 1953. By the terms of said ordinance it became effective on the 20th day after publication or the 30th day after final passage, whichever
was most remote from the date of final passage in compliance with section 10-6-12, U. C. A. 1953. That said Ordinance became effective on the 21st day of March, 1953.
That on the 7th day of March, 1953, 16 days after
the final passage of said ordi'nance and only 14 days prior
to the effective date of said ordinance, and 9 days after
the publication of said ordinance, attorney for the Sponsors served upon the City Recorder of Cedar City, Utah
an Application for Petition copies, dated and signed by
the applicants on the 7th day of March, 1953 as set forth
in Petitioners "Exhibit B". That this act took place 16
days after the final passage of said Ordinance. That same
was receipted for on that date by the City Recorder of Cedar City, Utah as shown by "Defendants Exhibit 1". That
said application for Petition Copies petitioned and requested that said referendum petition, for the purpose of
circulation, be divided into 15 sections, each section to
contain 6 circulation sheets, and to have attached to the
front sheet thereof, a certified petition copy of said refere·ndun1 petition copy to be -printed in six-point type,
single leaded, to be securely bound at the top thereof, in
the style and form provided by law.
That in accordance with said request and with Section 20-11-13 U. C. A. 1953 the City Recorder of Cedar
City, Utah on the lOth day of March, 1953 requested bids
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from 3 competent printers for the printing of said petition copies and said circulation sheets. That on the same
date, but after requests for bids had gone to three printers, attorney for the sponsors presented to the City Recorder of Cedar City, Utah 15 alleged petition copies for
her certification and signature and stated that he would
be back for them in 15 minutes. The City Recorder of
Cedar City, Utah requested legal advice on these matters.
Without waiting for this decision the sponsors com~
menced circulating for signatures various documents
which had never been presented to the City Recorder of
Cedar City, Utah, which did not bear her signature, Seal,
or certification, as required by law, which had not been
prepared. by said City Recorder of Cedar City, Utah,
which the City Recorder of Cedar City, Utah, had not
numbered or made a record thereof as required by law
and had had no opportunity to do so, and which docllments had no force or effect whatsoever.
That on the 12th day of March, 1953 Sponsors received notice to the effect that the City Recorder of
Cedar City, Utah had been advised not to sign the instruments left with her on the lOth day of March, 1953 by
and for the reason that they did not substantially conform to the statute and that same were available at the
office of the City Recorder of Cedar City, Utah as set
forth in "Defendants Exhibit 3."
That on or about the 15th day of March, 1953 Sponsors at the office of the City Recorder of Cedar City, Utah
accepted deli very of the i terns that had been left with
the City Recorder of Cedar City, Utah on the lOth day of
March, 1953.
That on the 17th day of March, 1953 the City Recorder of Cedar City, Utah notified the Sponsors of the
lowest bid that had been received for the publication of
the Petition Copies and Circulation sheets as requested
by the Sponsors and required by law. That said notice is
set forth in "Defendants Exhibit 4."
That on the 20th day of March, 1953 J. R. Palmer and
Orville Isom, Attorney for the Sponsors, delivered to the
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office of the City Recorder of Cedar City, Utah certain
documents which they represented to be petition copies
that had been previously circulated, which had never
been previously exhibited to the City Recorder of Cedar
City, Utah and which were of no force or effect whatsoever. That with said alleged petition copies were two
certificates prepared by the Sponsors and signed by the
County Clerk of Iron County, Utah. That the first of these
certificates is set forth as "Petitioners Exhibit D" and
the second of same is set forth as "Defendants Exhibit 7."
That on the 23rd day of March, 1953 the City Recorder of Cedar City, Utah, after receiving advice from her
duly authorized council and from the City Council of
Cedar City, Utah declared said documents insufficient
for a referendum election as set forth in "Defendants Exhibit 9" and that on the 24th day of March, 1953 duly
notified the Sponsors of her action. That the receipt of
said notice is also set forth in "Defendants Exhibit 8."
That on the 24th day of March, 1953 Sponsors re-·
quested a recount. That on the 28th day of March, 1953
Sponsors were notified of the results of the recount and
invited to have a representative present for a further recount. That the Sponsors did not send a representative
to the further recount.
That when the items which were delivered to the
City Recorder of Cedar City, Utah on the 20th day of
April, 1953 were on that date checked in the office of the
Clerk of Iron County, Utah that a deputy of the clerk
was present but that the Sponsors did any checking that
might have been done that day and that a sponsor or a
representative of the sponsor made all marks that were
made on the alleged petition copies. That after so doing
the County Clerk merely signed the certificates previously prepared by the sponsors. That said county clerk
signed same in the presence of the Attorney for Spo·nsors
who had been present and participated in the checking
that was done on said alleged petition copies.
That on the 30th day of March, 1953, 9 days after
the Ordinance in question had become effective, the
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Sponsors delivered to the City Recorder of Cedar City,
Utah a Certificate fron1 the County Clerk of Iron County,
Utah as set forth in "Petitioners Exhibit E-1" which purported to supplement the former certificate.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
1. Before a writ of Mandamus will issue there must
be be shown a clear right to the relief sought and a clear
duty of performance resting on the one whom it is sought
to compel to do the act.
2. That the instrument presented to the City Recorder of Cedar City, Utah on 20 March, 1953 was of no force
or effect whatsoever and placed no duty upon the City
Recorder of Cedar City, Utah · or any other official of
Cedar City, Utah.
3. That a supplementary certificate submitted 9 days
after the effective date of an ordinance cannot have any
effect on said ordinance being effective.
4. That the said certificate, purporting to supplement
a former act of the sponsors, only added to the confusion
and made it more difficult for the City Recorder of Cedar
City, Utah to determine the number of qualified voters,
if any, on said alleged Petition Copies.
ARGUMENT
1. It is a well established rule established over a long
period that "Mandamus will issue only where there is a
clear right to the relief sought and a clear duty of performance resting on the one whom it is sought to compel
to do the act." This is upheld in the Utah cases decided
by the Supreme Court of the State of Utah over a considerable period of time. A few of the Utah Authorities on
this item are as follows: Board of Education of Ogden
City vs. A·nderson, 74 Pac. (2d) 681, 93 Utah 522 which
holds as follows:
The right to require a person or a court to proceed
and legal duty to do so must be free from doubt, oth-
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erwise remedy by writ of Mandamus must be denied.
Colorado Development Co. vs. Creer, 80 Pac. (2d) 685, 96,
Utah 1 holds as follows:
In Mandamus, the plaintiff must show plain right
for which the law gives no adequate remedy, except
Mandamus, and duty in defendants to perform a
ministerial act, including a showing of authority,
ability and means to perform that act.
Harris vs. Turner, 85 Pac. (2d) 824, 96 Utah 342 holds:
Whenever action by a court or other officer is sought
to be compelled by Mandamus, it must be shown that
there .is a clear legal duty to act as requested, free
from doubt, imperative, and without discretion to
act or refuse.
This view is upheld by ·neighboring jurisdictions in the
following cases Grable vs. Childers, 56 Pac. (2d) 357, 176
Okl. 360; McDo·nald vs. Pritzl, 93 Pac. (2d) 11, 60 Idaho
354; State ex rei. Conklin vs. Buckingham, 83 Pac. (2d)
462, 58 Nevada 450; and State ex rei. Moore vs. Nan Tassel Real Estate & Livestock Co., 79 Pac. (2d) 276, 53
Wyo. 89
In the present case being considered there is no
showing of any right for the relief sought nor is there
any showing of any duty of performance resting on the
City Recorder of Cedar City, Utah or any other official
of Cedar City, Utah.
2. The facts as stipulated and the law governing Referendum Petitions in cities in the state of Utah show definitely that the instrument presented to the City Recorder of Cedar City, Utah on 20 March, 1953, alleged to be
a Refere·ndum Petition, was of no force or effect whatsoever and placed ·no duty upon the City Recorder of
Cedar City or any other official of Cedar City, Utah.
The basic law in the state of Utah stems from Article VI, Section 1, Subsection 2 of the Constitution of the
State of Utah which clearly places upon the legislature
of the state of Utah a duty to state what percentage of
the people of a city may initiate a Referendum on an Or·
dinance of said city and also places a duty on said legis·
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Iature to state the manner and time in which said Referendum may be had. In response to this Constitutional Requirement the legislature has enacted Chapter 11, Title
20 of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953, consisting of 25
sections \Vhich is the la\v as required by said constitutional provision that states the proportion of the people
that may cause a referendum of a city Ordinance and the
time and manner in \vhich same can be performed. The
Sponsors have stated in their brief to the effect that this
is very unsatisfactory legislation concerni'ng this rna tter
of Referendum in cities. However there is no question to
the effect that this is not the legislation that governs Referendum in cities and while the Sponsors in the case at
hand may not approve of the legislation never the less
said Sponsors, and the City Officials of Cedar City, Utah,
are admittedly bound by this legislation, and must conform to this legislation for a Referendum and are not
allowed to initiate a proceeding of their own for this
matter.
Our basic law is well settled to the effect that there
is no authority for Initiative and Refere·ndum procedures
in cities except as stated by Constitution, Statute, or
Charter. It is also well settled that where so stated by
Constitution, Statute, or Charter, that the Initiative and
Referendum procedure therein stated is exclusive and
Mandatory. For the basic law on this matter see 43 Corpus Juris, at page 583, Section 946. ORDINANCES UNDER INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM LAWS, and
conti'nuing sections thereafter, as follows:
Section 948. Source of Power. Unless authorized by
organic law or by charter or general statute, a municipal council is without authority to pass ordinances providing for a referendum of any kind.
Section 950. Method of Exercising Power. The method of exercising initiative and refere·ndum powers
must conform to, and comply with, the mode presented in the constitution or statute conferring the
power.
Section 956. Petition, in General. The petition must
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comply in all respects with the statutory requirements, which are construed as being mandatory. A
petition. which measures up to this standard is sufficient.
Section 956. Amendments. An insufficient petition
for a referendum cannot be amended after the ordinance has gone into effect, and does not necessarily
operate to suspend the ordinance.
Section 959. Time of Filing. After the time limited
for filing a petition has expired a defective petition cannot be amended and such amendments are of
no effect to suspend the ordinance.
In view of this the action of Sponsors in entirely ignoring the statutory procedure and initiating a procedure
that substatially differs from that set forth in the statute that produced an unofficial document of no force or
effect whatsoever. As a matter of fact that Sponsors
waited until they had only 14 days in which to accomplish the statutory procedure and then violated the mandatory statutory procedures in substantial ways and
have now brought this mandamus proceeding asking the
Supreme Court of the state of Utah to require the City
Recorder of Cedar City, Utah to endorse a referendum
procedure that materially differs with mandatory statutory requirements and place on a ballot a Unofficial Referendum. In view of the long established authority that
these statutory proceedings are mandatory there can be
no conclusion on this rna tter except to deny the Petition
and order the City Recorder of Cedar City, Utah not to
put said Unofficial Referendum on the ballot.
That the procedure of the Sponsors did not substantially comply with the statutes of the state of Utah cannot be denied by the Sponsors. After presenting to the
City Recorder of Cedar City, Utah, their Application for
Petition Copies specifically requesting that the statute
be complied with the Sponsors apparently immediately
ordered pri'nted their own version of the Petition. On 10
March, 1953 this was presented to the City Recorder of
Cedar City, Utah for signature. She took time to obtain
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legal counsel on this matter and without waiting for her
decision the Sponsors commenced circulation of a spurious and unofficial document that the City Recorder of
Cedar City, Utah had never seen and had never had the
opportunity to see. At this point an unanswered question
that this writer has it this, "If the City Recorder of Cedar
City, Utah had signed the matters presented to her, how
would the Sponsors have gotten the signature they had
already obtained upon the circulation sheets attached to
the Petition Copies signed by the City Recorder?" Of
course this answer lies with the Sponsors and not with
this writer, but the Sponsors have stipulated that they
circulated the sheets presented to the City Recorder of
Cedar City, Utah on 20th :r,iarch, 1953 prior to the receipt of notice from the City Recorder of Cedar City, Utah
that the items left with her on 10 March, 1953 would not
be signed. If the Sponsors had not commenced the circulation for signatures of some unofficial document prior
to the receipt of notice that the alleged copies left with
the City Recorder on 10 March, 1953 would not be signed
they should have brought an action for Mandamus at
that time. The Supreme Court of the State of Utah has
so held in the case of Coleman vs. Bench, 84 Pac. (2d)
412, 96 Utah 1943 as follows:
The processes of initiatio·n and referendum are exposed to act of judiciary at certain points along the
way because they are not in control of a single
agency, but depend on certain ministerial officers
doing their duty, and, therefore, resort may be had
to judiciary for mandamus for purpose of enforcing
processes of initiation which might not be enforced
in any other way.
This writer cannot understand the total disregard of the
Sponsors for commencing circulation for signature of unofficial spurious documents without waiting for the decision of the City Recorder, and certainly had they waited for the decision of the City Recorder a·nd had been
unsatisfied with said decision their remedy should have
been a resort to mandamus at that time and not the cir-
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culation of unofficial, uncertified, spurious documents of
no legal effect whatsoever.
But the fact of the matter is that the Sponsors condoned and approved the action of the City Recorder of
Cedar City, Utah and continued the circulation of said
unofficial, uncertified, spurious documents of no legal
effect whatsoever and presented to the City Recorder
of Cedar City, Utah on 20 March, 1953 a document
which said Sponsors allege to be a good and sufficient
Refere·ndum Petition even though it had never been previously seen by the City Recorder of Cedar City, Utah,
and even though she had never had an opportunity to see
said document and even though she had never had an opportunity to do those things by law required of her to be
done in connection with a Petition for Referendum.
Therefore the questions actually before the court
are not concerning the action of the City Recorder of
Cedar City, Utah in connection with the matters presented to her on 10 March, 1953 but are questions concerning
the validity of the document presented to said City Recorder on 20 March, 1953 and its sufficiency as a Petition
· for Refendum.
The defendants contend that same was not a valid
Document and that same was insufficient for a Petition
for Referendum for the following reasons:
I. Their is no question but that the Constitution of
the State of Utah and Chapter 11 of Title 20 of U.C.A.
1953 control this matter. The p. :·eviously cited matters in
Corpus Juris state the existing law in relation to substantial compliance with the law being mandatory This has
been upheld in the case of Allen vs. Rasmussen, City Recorder, 117 Pac. (2d) 287, as follows:
This is so because while, Section 25-10-23 (now 20-1123) prescribes that the manner of exercising the referendum powers reserved to the people of cities and
towns shall be "similar" to the procedure prescribed
for state ini tia ti ve and referendum the deviation, if
any other than that elsewhPre expressed in the
statute, which might be suggested by the use of the
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word "similiar", is limited by the other provision
of such section wherein is expressed legislative intention to make the procedure in referring a municipal ordinance "as nearly as practicable" the same a~
that prescribed f<?r reference of an act of the legislature.
This very definitely established that substantial compliance with the statutes of the state of Utah is required
for the production of an effective Referendum Petition.
II. In the case at hand the Provisions of Law relating to Referendum Procedure, and the Conditions precedent to the Acceptance, by the City Recorder of Cedar
City, Utah, of the Alleged Petitiou copies had not been
complied with in the following particulars:
A. The Alleged Petition Copies presented to the City
Recorder of Cedar City, Utah had never beeri printed
under the authority or directions of the City Recorder of
Cedar City, Utah as required by law.
Section 20-11-13, U.C.A. 1953 puts a number of duties
on the City Recorder in a City Referendum, to-wit: to
determine the number of petition copies desired, to determine the number of circulation sheets required, solicit
bids from not less than three competent printers for the
petition copies and circulation sheets and for the printing of the certificate that the title of the ordinance contained thereon is the true and correct number of the title
of this law as proposed for ref~rendum, notification of
the lowest and best bid received, the payment of the bid
for the printing of the petition copies and. of the sum of
50 cents per hundred for the circulation sheets, making
up the petition copies. Of the items thus required of the
City Recorder not one had bee·n performed by the City
Recorder of Cedar City, Utah on the spurious and unofficial document delivered to her office by the Sponsors
on 20 March, 1953. Certainly the Sponsors do not contend
that this section of the law has been substantially complied with. Certainly leaving of the certificate required
by this section is not substantial compliance with the
law on this matter. In this section of the statute there is
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shown a legislative intent that a person asked to sign a
petition may have the assurance that same is the correct
number arid title of the Ordinance. Can this assurance
be given if the certificate to this effect is left off entirely.
Sponsors contend that they have the right to have
these petition copies printed to suit theirself. Is that
the legislative. intent of the statutes on this n1atter? Do
these statutes at any place state to the effect that if the
Sponsors sleep on their rights until such time as the time
is very short on this rna tter then and in that case they
may bypass the statute and prepare some document to
their own satisfaction and then circulate same and represent that it is an official act of the City Recorder of
Cedar City, Utah and that same is an official Document?
Certainly this action was not the intent of the legislature
at the time the statute was adopted nor is it the intent
of Article VI, Section 1 of the Constitution of the State
of Utah.
In their brief the Sponsors contend that that portion of the statute requiring the bids is for their protection. Is that the case. Sponsors cite 56 Am. Jur. Page 109
for their authority fn this matter. Continuing the citation
of the Sponsors we find as follows:
Because requirements of a statute enacted for the
public good may not be nullified or varied by private
contract, the donee of a private right created by
statute for the public good does not have the legal
power to make an anticipant waiver of such right.
56 Am. Jur. 115. Intention to Relinquish. A prerequicite ingredient of the waiver of a right or privilege
consists of an intention to relinquish it. No man can
be bound by a waiver of his rights, unless such waiver is distinctly made, with full knowledge of the
rights which he intends to waive and that fact that
he knows his rights, and intends to waive them,
must plainly appear. As in other situations the question whether waiver will be found in any particular
case depends not upon the secret information of the
party against whom it is asserted, but upon the effect
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which his conduct has had upon the other party.
There is no waiver unless the waiver is so intended
by one party and so accepted by the other.
Can it be said that the Sponsors had any rights in this
matter that they could waive. Certainly if they had any
rights that they might waive the delivery to the City Recorder of Cedar City, Utah of a written application for
Petition Copies in conformity with the law cannot now
be construed as an intention to waive any rights under
the law. Also if the Sponsors had any rights in this matter they must of necessity be a right in connection with
a public good and cannot be waived therefor. Thus the
statement of the Sponsors to the effect that they waived
their rights, if any, after failing to comply with the statute in a substantial manner, after requesting the City Re- ·
corder, in writing, to comply with said statute seems to
present the Sponsors in inconsistent positions. Can any
person request that a law be complied with, then fail to
substantially comply with the same law and make substantial changes in the contents of the item they have
just requested be furnished to them in compliance with
the law, and then take the position that they have waived
their rights? Or is compliance with the law to be deemed
a matter of convenience.
B. The Alleged Petition Copies that were circulated
for signatures were never signed by, or issued by the
City Recorder as required by law, and no record thereof
was kept in the City Recorder's office, a·nd said Alleged
Petition Copies and circulation sheets were wholly unofficial and void.
The Sponsors have stipulated that the items presented to the City Recorder of Cedar City, Utah had never
been previously seen by her, or previously presented to
her. Is this substantial compliance with the statute. Did
the statute intend that the City Recorder should prepare
these petition Copies, and circulation sheets, a·nd keep a
record of them, and have them go out for signature as
official documents under her certificate and seal or did
the statute intend that any one that felt so inclined
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might prepare and put out for circulation and signature
any document and represent that this is a referendum
petition? Did the statute intend that any one that desired might take a blank sheet of paper and circulate for
signature and state that this is a referendum petition on
some sort of a subject? Absurd! Of course this contention is absurd. But it is exactly what has happened in
this case. It is certainly ·not possible that this is what
the Constitution of the State of Utah provides for when
it states "within such manner and within such time as
may be provided by law." Certainly there is no intent in
our constitution of any sort of a referendum petition
bei'ng circulated for signature except as provided by law.
Certainly there is no intent in our statute of petitions
being printed independently of the City Recorder and
being completely circulated for signature without the
certificates required by law, without the signature of the
city recorder required by law. Is this circulation of a
spurious, unofficial, and unlawful document substantial
compliance with the statue. These defects are not defects
of form but are material and substa·ntial defects that connot be overlooked.
C. The Alleged Petition Copies and Circulation sheets
were wholly unofficial and unauthorized when circulated
for signature.
There is no authority for the preparation of Petition
Copies a·nd Circulation Sheets as in this case prepared
by the Sponsors. The statute is definite that this is the
duty of the City Recorder. For the Sponsors simply to
print and circulate same without regard to the requirements of the statute was certainly not contemplated by
the Constitution of the State of Utah nor the statute
controlling this function.
D. The alleged Petition Copies and Circulatio·n Sheets
when construed in the light of the formula set-forth in
the sworn certificate of the County Clerk of Iron County, contained the signatures of no registered voters of
Iron County.
The controlling I a w on this rna tter in this jurisdic-
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tion is the case of Halgreen vs. Welling 63 Pac. (2d) 550,
which has been affirmed by Allen vs. Rasmussen, 117
Pac. (2d) 287. The Halgreen vs. \Veiling case holds:
We think that the statute is cl~ar that the clerk
should indicate by appropriate marks, explained, or
by words such as "registered" or "not registered"
or the equivalent thereof by abbreviations or otherwise so the Secretary of State can determine from an
inspection of the petition copies "whether or not each
name is that of a registered voter."
The county clerks are required to certify that the
signers are or are not registered voters. The Secretary of State is to determine how many qualified
registered voters have signed the petition-it is a
matter of counting qualified registered voters' names
on the assembled petition copies.
The Secretary was without the necessary information and therefore without jurisdiction to say that
he had "received, counted, and found sufficient" the
number of qualified signers on the iniative petition
as a whole. The names could be counted, but it could
not be determined whether they were qualified
signers. Only qualified signers make a "sufficient"
petition.
By taking this formula, that the certificate of the county
clerk as to the number of qualified voters cannot be considered by the City Recorder but she must make an independent verification of the number of qualified voters
based upon the formula of the County Clerk we reach
an amazing result with the case at hand. The certificate
of the County Clerk as shown in "Defendants' Exhibit 7"
states "And I further certify that I have indicated such
names appearing thereon as are registered voters in
Cedar City, Utah, by placing before each of said names
a check in the column where the name of such registered
voter appears; I further certify that all the names on said
sheets not marked with a check either are not registered
voters in Cedar City or are the names concerning which
I have some question which prevented my certifying
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that they are registered voters in Cedar City, Utah."
Examination of the spurious document \Vhich accompanied said certificate reveals that in front of the names
of the supposed signers are various numbers, behind said
names are various marks, including five different types
and styles of check marks, some crosses, some circles,
and many without a mark of any kind. Examination reveals that there are some that have no marks in front.
When the City Recorder makes an independent application of the formula of the county clerk she can arrive at
only one result. That there is not a registered voter of
Cedar City, Utah with signature on said alleged petition
copies.
On the 30th day of March, 1953 the Sponsors confirmed the finding of the City Recorder of Cedar City,
Utah by submitting a Supplementary Certificate on the
same subject. This certificate is identical except it states
that the check marks are behi'nd the names. It also states
that it is a certificate to supplement the original certificate. This supplementary certificate is set forth in "Petitioner's Exhibit E-1''. Certainly if the original certificate was correct and merely applied wrongly by the City
Recorder of Cedar City, Utah then there would have been
no need to submit the supplementary certificate. Remembering that the certificate sub1nitted 30 March, 1953
states that it is supplementary to the certificate of 20
March, 1953 it does not clarify the subject, if it could be
accepted, but further confuses same a·nd makes it that
much harder to get a determination. The original cereificate states that the check marks are in front. A supplement thereto merely states that they are behind and that
this is a supplementary certificate. Which Certificate is
correct? One does not correct the other but by its contents merely supplements the other. Construing the two
together is there any way that a City Recorder or any
other official can determine the number of registered
voters on the Alleged Petition Copies? Are the check
marks behind or in front? Which certificate is correct.
What effect does a supplementary certificate that states·
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something contrary to the certificate it supplements have
on the original certificate? These are the questions that
the City Recorder is expected to answer. These are the
questions that the City Recorder would have to a·nswer
prior to a determination of the number of registered voters on the alleged petition copies. With the information
thus available she cannot determine the number of registered voters on the alleged petition copies and therefor
there could be no change in her result co·ncerning the
number of voters and concerning the sufficiency of said
alleged petition copies.
The sponsors cite a California case on this matter to
the effect that the late certificate can be 'Considered by
the City Recorder. The case that they cite, Willett vs.
Jordan, Secretary of State, 53 Pac (2d) 1025 is on a statute entirely different than our statute. In the Ca~ifornia
statute the county clerk is required to determine the
actual number of registered voters on each petition copy
and so certify. Our statute reqnires the county clerk to
identify the registered voters and the City Recorder to
make the determination of number based on this identification. The statutes involved are entirely differe·nt. Especially significant in this matter is 43 Corpus Juris 589
concerning amendments which reads as follows:
As insufficient petition for a referendum cannot be
amended after the ordi'nance has gone into effect,
and does not necessarily operate to suspend the ordinance.
Of greater interest to this jurisdiction is the case of Allen
vs. Rasmussen, 117 Pac. (2d) 287, which reads as follows.
The time when it is obligatory to have before the filing officer a sufficient petition to require submission
has been by the legislature keyed to the effective
date of such law, absent such a petition then filed.
But here we are asked to vary the procedure clearly
indica ted by the legislature in such a way as to defeat some of its salutary features. This we are not at
liberty to do.
Thus in the Allen vs Rasmussen case the Supreme Court
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of the State of Utah clearly holds that it is necessary for
a sufficient petition to be filed prior to the time that the
ordinance becomes effective. This the Sponsors admit
that they have not done because 9 days after the ordinance became effective the Sponsors felt that it was necessary to submit a supplementary certificate on the
matter.
Sponsors contend that the City Recorder had a duty
to notify them of the Insufficiency in time to correct
same. This is not necessarily true. On this subject 43
Corpus Juris 591 states:
Time of certification. Although the statute does not
fix the time within which certification must be made,
this duty must be performed within a reasonable
time.
Now the question of what is a reasonable time as answered in 102 A.L.R. 51 to the effect that 5 days from the
time a petition was submitted until it was set for hearing
concerning its sufficiency was reasonable and that 10
days was reasonable. The same annotation indicates that
30 days has been held reasonable. In the case at hand the
Sponsors contend that an Alleged Petition submitted in
the Ia te afternoon of 20 March, 1953, actually determined
by the City Recorder to be insufficient on 23 March, 1953
of which said Sponsors received notice on 24 March, 1953
is an unreasonable period of time for the determination
and that there was a duty to make a detern1ination so
that they could remedy the defects prior to the ordinance becoming effective 21 March, 1953. Certainly the
above. quoted authority on this subject does not consider
a time of three days in arriving at the determination of
sufficiency an unreasonable length of time.
E. The Alleged Petition Copies did not contain the
Certificate required by Section 20-11-12, U.C.A. 1953
This section contemplates that each Petition Copy
circulated shall have a certificate to the effect that it is
a full, true and correct copy of said Petition. This was not
done nor was there an opportunity to do so. The Sponsors have admitted circulating alleged Petition Copies
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that the City Recorder had never seen or never had an
opportunity to see, and Sponsors have Stipulated to the
effect that this was done prior to the receipt of the notice on 12 March, 1953 that others would not be signed.
This means that the items circulated for signature may
or may not have been correct Petition Copies. Certainly
this was not and is not the intent of the legislative act
controlling Referendum and certainly this is a mandatory
requirement.
F. The alleged Petition Copies and Circulation sheets
were not printed in 6 point type as required by Section
20-11-13, U.C.A. 1953.
There is not a question but that this is one of the requirements of the statute. The Sponsors have stipulated
that this was not complied with. This seems to be in the
spirit of the entire action of the Sponsors in this matter.
CONCLUSIONS
Therefore Defendants are convinced and argue that
the Plaintiffs' action for a writ of mandamus should not
be allowed for the following reasons:
1. That the plaintiffs have fai~ed to show a clear
right to the relief sought and have failed to show a duty
of performance resting on the City Recorder of Cedar
City, Utah or any other official of Cedar City, Utah.
2. That the instrume·nt presented to the City Recorder of Cedar City, Utah on 20 March, 1953 was of no
force or effect whatsoever and placed no duty upon the
City Recorder of Cedar City, Utah or any other official
of Cedar City, Utah.
3. That a Supplementary certificate submitted 9
days after the effective date of an Ordinance cannot have
any effect on said ordinance being effective.
4. That substa·ntial compliance with the Constitution
of the State of Utah and the statutes of the State of Utah
governing the procedure for Referendum of a city Ordinance is a prerequisite of a valid referendum petition and
failure to substantially comply with same prevents the
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alleged referendum petition from being effective, and
failure to substantially comply with same will not prevent said ordinance from becoming effective.
5. That because of the failure of the Sponsors to
substantially comply with the Constitutional and statutory requirements concerning a municipal referendum
the Ordinance in question became effective on the 21st.
day of March, 1953.
PATRICK H. FENTON,
Cedar City, Utah.
Attorney for Defendants
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